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FOUCAULT AND GADAMER: LIKE APPLES AND ORANGES
PASSING IN THE NIGHT
GARY WICKHAM*
INTRODUCTION
In introducing their book, Michel Foucault:  Beyond Structuralism
and  Hermeneutics,  (first  published  in  1982,  one  of  the  earliest
attempts  in English  at a  book-length  exposition of the direction and
nuances  of Foucault's  work-one which  has  stood  the  test of time),
Hubert  Dreyfus  and  Paul  Rabinow  tell  us  that  philosophical
hermeneutics "gives  up the phenomenologists'  attempt  to understand
man as a meaning-giving  subject, but attempts to preserve meaning by
locating  it  in  the  social  practices  and  literary  texts  which  man
produces."1  They  go on to identify two types of hermeneutics which
emerged from Heidegger's Being and Time.
The  first  involves  "the  way  Dasein  interprets  itself  in  this
everyday  activity.  This  'primordial  understanding'  in our  everyday
practices  and discourse,  which  is overlooked  by the practitioners  but
which  they  would  recognize  if  it  were  pointed  out  to  them,  is  the
subject  of much  recent  hermeneutic  investigation. '2  This  school  of
Heideggerian  hermeneutics3  "claims  to  find  that  the  deep  truth
hidden by the everyday  practices is the unsettling groundlessness  of a
way of being which  is, so to speak, interpretation  all the way down."'
They  suggest  that  this  school  can  be  characterized  as  "the
hermeneutics of suspicion."5
The  second  type  of  hermeneutics  is  that  developed  by  Hans-
Georg  Gadamer.  It  "gives  deep  hermeneutics  a  more  positive
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1.  HUBERT  L.  DREYFUS  &  PAUL  RABINOW,  MICHEL  FOUCAULT:  BEYOND  STRUC-
TURALISM AND  HERMENEUTICS,  at xv (1982).
2.  Id. at xvii.
3.  See id. at xvii-xviii.  They cite Harold  Garfinkel,  Charles Taylor, Clifford  Geertz,  and
Thomas Kuhn as examples.
4.  Id. at xviii.
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direction  as a method for  reappropriating  a profound  understanding
of Being preserved  in  traditional  linguistic  practices."'6  Dreyfus and
Rabinow  argue  that  Foucault  does  not  belong  in  either  of  these
groupings of hermeneutists.  They express their argument with a great
deal of vigor in regard to the second possibility:
Foucault  is  not interested  in recovering  man's unnoticed  everyday
self-interpretation ....  Foucault  does  not  believe  that  a  hidden
deep truth  is  the  cause  of the  misinterpretation  embodied  in our
everyday  self-understanding.  He  [Foucault]  captures  all  such
positions...  [especially]  Gadamer's[,]  at  an  appropriate  level  of
abstraction  when  he defines  what he calls  commentary  "as  the re-
apprehension through the manifest meaning of discourse of another
meaning  at once  secondary and  primary,  that is,  more  hidden  but
also more fundamental"  [The Order of Things].  Such an account of
interpretation,  he claims, "dooms us to  an endless  task ...  rest[ing]
on the postulate that speech is an  act of 'translation'  . . .an exegesis,
which  listens..,  to  the  Word  of  God,  ever  secret,  ever  beyond
itself"  [Birth of the Clinic].  Foucault  dismisses  this approach  with
the remark, "For centuries we have waited  in  vain for the  decision
of the word [Birth of the Clinic]."
7
Charged, as I am, with exploring the possibility that Gadamerian
philosophical  hermeneutics,  especially  as  it  has been  taken  up  as a
framework  for furthering  critical sociolegal  investigations,  may  have
some  things  in  common  with  some  recent  developments  in
Foucaultian  thinking-the  "governmentality"  approach-which  has
also  recently  started  being  used  to  guide  some  excursions  into
sociolegal studies,  I would like to  say that things have  changed  since
Dreyfus and Rabinow penned  the above sentiments.  I would like to,
but I cannot.  While certain Gadamerian  moves seem at first glance to
speak  directly  to  the  Foucaultian  "governmentality"  way  of  going
about  particular  studies,  including  sociolegal  studies,  on  closer
examination the similarities evaporate.  While I do my best to sound a
positive  "let's get  together  again  soon"  note,  I confess  at the  outset
that most of my  argument  here  suggests that Foucaultian  sociolegal
studies and  Gadamerian  sociolegal  studies will remain no  more than
nodding acquaintances.
I  am  not  particularly  concerned  here  with  promoting  the
Foucaultian governmentality  approach, or even explicating it, though
I  readily  acknowledge  that  I  am  very  much  a  Foucaultian  govern-
mentality thinker in the Gadamerians'  den.8
6.  Id. at xix.
7.  Id.
8.  "Being  a  Foucaultian"  is,  as  far as  I can  tell, my  only  "area  of  expertise"  (a  tragic
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In the first Part of this Article, I provide both a brief summary of
the  governmentality  approach  and  a  few  indications  of  its
applicability to sociolegal studies, but I do so more by way of allowing
the  reader  to  see  the  position  from  which  I  pose  my  gloomy
assessment  of  potential  relations  between  the  Gadamerians  and
Foucaultian  governmentality  scholars  than  by  way  of  serious
explication.  In the  second Part,  I  go on with  my  opening gambit-
examining  some  basic  differences  between  the  main  direction  of
Foucault's work  and  philosophical hermeneutics.  Third, I explore  a
small  sample  of  Gadamerian  literature  to  show  how  the  pieces
examined  in  fact  support  the  proposition  that  useful  links  between
Gadamerians  and Foucaultians  are unlikely.9  Finally,  I discuss just  a
few possible  exceptions  to this trend, taking us more  firmly onto the
ground of the sociolegal  (a ground which is glimpsed at various points
in the earlier parts).
Please  allow  me  a  point  of terminology  before  I  proceed.  I
appreciate that the focus of this Symposium  is "critical legal studies,"
and  I appreciate  that this  is  a very  definite movement  within  North
American  sociolegal  scholarship  as  well  as  a  definite  way  of
approaching such scholarship.  I beg the reader's indulgence here: the
term  has  no  such  currency  in  Australia.  As  such,  I  prefer,  as  is
already  clear, the  Anglo-Australian  term  "sociolegal  studies,"  and  I
use it or some variant of it throughout.
I.  SUMMARIZING THE FOUCAULTIAN  GOVERNMENTALITY
APPROACH AND  ITS POTENTIAL FOR SOCIOLEGAL SCHOLARS
In  a recent, comprehensive  book-length  survey  of the  notion of
governmentality,  Mitchell  Dean  acknowledges  that  the  "study  of
governmentality  is continuous  with"  some aspects  of theories  of the
state  (particularly  in  that  it too  "regards  the  exercise  of  power and
confession in itself).  I assume  I have been invited to participate  in this delightful  Symposium-
an  invitation  for  which  I  am  most  grateful-in  order  provide  a  view  from  a  Foucaultian
perspective,  not in spite of it.
9.  I  pretend  to  make  no  exegesis  in  this  Part.  I  pointedly  use  a  hybrid  Gadamer/
Gadamerian, constructed  from parts presented to me by only a  few scholarly writings, including
some of a sociolegal nature.  Even when the signatures on these resources include that of Hans-
Georg Gadamer I  do  not claim to approach  any "essence  of Gadamer."  I  make this move  not
just out of a commitment  to a  theoretical stance that denies  the possibility of pinning down any
authorial  core, but  more  by way of realistic appraisal  of what  a  short  article  such  as this  can
achieve.  I cannot offer anything approaching a comprehensive view or review, so I do not try  (I
do not insult Gadamerian  scholarship  by attempting to claim membership without the necessary
qualifications).  I can offer an argument, and that  I do try; if my argument falls because  my tiny
sample of Gadamerian  literature turns out to be an unrepresentative  sample, then so be it.CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
authority as anything  but self-evident"),  notes that it "does,  however,
break  with many  of the  characteristic  assumptions of theories  of the
state," 1 0  and outlines Foucault's understanding of the basic notion of
government  as  "the  conduct  of  conduct,"  especially  as  it  involves
thinking  about  the  very  act  of  governing.1  He  moves  on  to  a
definition of the term "governmentality":
It is possible to distinguish two broad  meanings of this term in the
literature.  The  second  is  a  historically  specific  version  of  the
first ....  In  this  first  sense,  the term  "governmentality"  suggests
what  we  have  just  noted.  It  deals  with  how  we  think  about
governing,  with  the  different  mentalities  of  government  ....  The
notions  of  collective  mentalities  and  the  idea  of  a  historians  of
mentalities  have  long  been  used  by  sociologists  (such  as  Emile
Durkheim and Marcel  Mauss) and by the Annales school of history
in  France  ....  For  such  thinkers,  a  mentality  is  a  collective,
relatively bounded unity, and is not readily examined  by those  who
inhabit  it ....  The  idea  of  mentalities  of  government,  then,
emphasizes the  way  in which  the thought involved  in practices of
government  is collective  and relatively taken for granted ....  [This]
is  to  say  that  the  way  we  think  about  exercising  authority  draws
upon the theories, ideas, philosophies  and  forms of knowledge  that
are part of our social and cultural products. 12
Dean  elaborates  the  second  meaning  (the  one  that  is  "a
historically specific version of the first") as follows:
Here,  "governmentality"  marks the emergence  of a  distinctly  new
form  of  thinking  about  and  exercising  of  power  in  certain
societies ....  This form of power is bound up with the discovery  of
a  new  reality, the economy,  and concerned with  a  new object,  the
population.  Governmentality  emerges  in  Western  European
societies  in the "early modern period" when the art of government
of  the state  becomes  a distinct  activity,  and  when  the  forms  and
knowledge  and  techniques  of  the  human  and  social  sciences
become integral to it. 3
Such a  complex  approach  obviously could  not  have  come  from
just one schematic essay produced  by Foucault in the late 1970s-On
Governmentality. 14  Rather,  this  approach  is  the  culmination  of  a
particular  reading  of Foucault's  oeuvre  coupled  with  a  rejection  of
standard sociological and political scientific accounts of power.  There
have been quite a few attempts by those who have followed Foucault
10.  MITCHELL DEAN,  GOVERNMENTAL1TY  9 (1999).
11.  Id. at 10-16.
12.  Id. at 16.
13.  Id. at 19.
14.  Michel Foucault, On Governmentality (Rosi Braidotti trans., 1979).
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to explicate  and defend  this approach.15  I have already said this is not
my  task  here,  but before  I  move  on  to  my main  tasks,  I  present  a
couple  of  other  introductions  to  the  approach  written  directly  for
sociolegal audiences.
In  a recent  piece  in  a North  American  law  journal,  the  noted
Foucaultian  sociolegal  scholar  Pat  O'Malley  goes  about  the  task  of
introducing governmentality scholarship to an audience he assumes to
be unfamiliar with it:
There  is  a  considerable  literature  exploring  and  developing  this
approach ....  Such  work  has  been  influenced  strongly  by  the
thinking of Michel Foucault ...  but has been advanced primarily in
recent  years  by  British  and  Australian  scholars.  The  journal
Economy and Society has been a principal site for the development
of this  approach,  which  is  frequently  referred  to  as  the  "govern-
mentality"  literature.  While  "governmentality"  refers  to  a  partic-
ular  technology  of  government  that  emerges  in  the  eighteenth
century, the term is  more  generally  used to  refer  to  the  approach
adopted in its study.  The approach  is characterized  by two primary
characteristics.  The  first  is  a  stress  on the  dispersal  of  "govern-
ment," that is, on the idea that government is not a preserve  of "the
state" but is carried  out at all level and sites  in societies-including
the  self  government  of  individuals ....  The  second  is  the
deployment of an analytic stance that favors  "how"  questions over
"why" questions.  In other words it favors accounts in terms of how
government of a certain kind becomes possible: in what manner it is
thought up by planners, using what concepts;  how it is intended to
be  translated  into  practice,  using  what  combination  of  means?
Only secondarily  is it concerned  with accounts  that seek to explain
government-in  the  sense  of  understanding  the  nature  of
government as the effect of other events.1 6
In Foucault  and Law, a book I published with Alan Hunt in 1994,
governmentality is tackled thusly:
The Foucault who inspires this part of our book is the Foucault who
is interested in government  alongside power, the Foucault who uses
the neologism  "governmentality"  to capture  the dramatic changes
in techniques  of government  developed  in the western  world from
the eighteenth  century onwards.  This may not be the most popular
15.  DEAN,  supra note  10,  is  excellent.  See also FOUCAULT  AND  POLITICAL  REASON:
LIBERALISM,  NEO-LIBERALISM  AND  RATIONALITIES  OF GOVERNMENT  (Andrew  Barry et  al.
eds.,  1996);  GAVIN  KENDALL  &  GARY  WICKHAM,  USING  FOUCAULT'S  METHODS  (1999);
GOVERNING  AUSTRALIA  (Mitchell  Dean  &  Barry  Hindess  eds.,  1998);  NIKOLAS  ROSE,
GOVERNING  THE  SOUL  (1989);  THE  FOUCAULT  EFFECT:  STUDIES  IN  GOVERNMENTALITY
(Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991); Peter Miller & Nikolas Rose, Governing Economic Life, 19
ECON.  &  SOC'Y  1  (1990);  Nikolas  Rose  & Peter  Miller,  Political Power Beyond  the  State.
Problematics  of Government, 43  BRIT. J. SOC. 173 (1992).
16.  Pat O'Malley, Imagining  Insurance Risk, Thrift and Industrial  Life Insurance in Britain,
5  CONN.  INS. L.J. 676, 679 n.7 (1999).CHICA GO-KENT  LA W REVIEW
Foucault,  but  we  take  it  to  be  the  most  rewarding  Foucault  for
those, like ourselves,  interested in new  directions for the sociology
of law.  We  are inspired  not just by Foucault's direct discussion  of
governmentality...  but also and  more  importantly  by the  work  of
others heavily influenced by Foucault's work on this notion which is
contributing  to  a  distinctive  approach ....  We  offer  a  sketch  of
governmentality  here..,  such  that  we  allow  the  reader  some
insight into the richness of the Foucaultian work in the area ....  In
simple  terms,  governmentality  is  the  dramatic  expansion  in  the
scope of government, featuring  an increase  in the number and size
of  the  governmental  calculation  mechanisms,  which  began  about
the middle of the eighteenth  century and  is still continuing.  In this
way, governmentality  is  about  the  growth  of modern  government
and  the  growth  of  modern  bureaucracies..,  the  moment  where
Foucault meets Weber ....  This simple  definition  is useful  up to a
point, but  it does not capture enough  of the subtlety of Foucault's
concept.  It  does  not,  for  example,  allow  us  to  follow  closely
Foucault's  periodisation.  While  government  and  its  mechanisms
have  indeed  boomed  from  the  eighteenth  century  onwards,  this
period  is hardly  unique  in the history of widespread,  sophisticated
governmental  techniques.  Ancient Egypt, ancient Greece,  ancient
Rome  and  many  examples  from  both  the  Western  and  Eastern
worlds  in  the period  from  the  fall  of  Rome  to  the  middle  of the
eighteenth  century all mark  boom times for just such  government;
all  these  examples  could  be  regarded  as  instances  of  govern-
mentality  were  we  to  use  only  this  simple  definition ....  To
enhance  this simple  definition  such that the  nuances  of Foucault's
governmentality  are more  easily recognized, we  suggest  a series  of
interconnected  definitions  around  the  following  themes:  the
emergence of the reason of state;  the emergence  of the problem of
population;  the  birth  of  modern  political  economy;  the  move
towards  liberal  securitisation;  and  the  emergence  of  the  human
sciences  as new mechanisms of calculation. 7
All this adds up, I suggest, to a position whereby law is treated  as
another means of and site of government, a position which refuses the
idea  of  law  as  some  special  area  that  influences  government  as  an
external  force.  Law,  by  this  way  of  thinking,  cannot  possibly  be
reduced  to  a  text  or  set  of  texts,  to  something  that  needs  inter-
pretation, or indeed to anything.  As with other objects studied under
governmentality,  legal  objects  must  be  studied  simply  as  discrete
practices of government, in the broad sense Foucault understands it-
"Practices  of government..,  do  not form those  types of totalities  in
which  the parts  are expressions  or  instances of  the  whole.  Rather,
17.  ALAN  HUNT & GARY WICKHAM,  FOUCAULT AND  LAW:  TOWARDS A  SOCIOLOGY  OF
LAW As GOVERNANCE 76  (1994).
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they should  be approached  as  composed  of heterogeneous  elements
having diverse historical trajectories ....  "18
II.  FOUCAULT'S WORK Is  NOT HERMENEUTICS
Dreyfus  and  Rabinow  offer  a  particularly  strong  indication  of
Foucault's  distance  from hermeneutics  by starting  with "his  earliest
published  work,  the  introduction  to  an  essay  by  Binswanger"  (a
Heideggerian  analyst).  In this  piece, they  tell  us,  "Foucault  clearly
identified  himself  with the  tradition of hermeneutic  ontology  which
originated  in  Heidegger's  Being and Time.  As  his  interests  in  the
social  effects rather  than the implicit  meaning  of everyday practices
developed,  however,  Foucault  simply  left  the  concerns  of  the
hermeneutic position behind."'19
Dreyfus  and Rabinow back this up with other points against  the
proposition that Foucault  might be read  as  sympathetic to, or  in the
tradition of, hermeneutics:
He has sought..,  to avoid the attempt of commentary as read
off  the  implicit  meaning  of  social  practices  as  well  as  the
hermeneutic unearthing of a different and deeper meaning of which
social actors are only dimly aware. 20
We  think  Foucault  is  implying...  that  we  cannot  simply
assume that there are deep meanings to investigate just because our
culture tells us there are.  This is just another way of saying that the
notion of deep meaning is a cultural construction. 21
Dreyfus  and  Rabinow  add  to  this  last  point  in  saying  that
Foucault  is  thereby  showing us  that  "man  as  object  and  subject"  is
produced "in our objectified, meaning-obsessed society. 22
Franqois  Wahl,  in  exploring  the  possibility  that  Foucault  is
beyond  philosophy,  even  goes  so  far  as  to  suggest  that Foucault  is
much  more  concerned  to  study  philosophy  as  an  "archaeological"
object  than  to  be  a  philosopher. 2 3   He  suggests  that  Foucault's
archaeological  approach  is certainly  not philosophy  in  the  way  that
18.  DEAN, supra note  10, at  29.  For an indication of  the direction of, and a bibliography
for, the emerging governmentality sociolegal  literature,  see Nikolas  Rose & Mariana Valverde,
Governed by Law?, 7 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 541 (1998).
19.  DREYFUS & RABINOW, supra note 1, at xxiii.
20.  Id. at xix-xx.
21.  Id. at xxi.
22.  Id.  Grahame  Thompson also captures the Foucaultian  opposition  to "deep"  meanings
well.  See  Grahame Thompson, Causality in Economics: Rhetorical Ethic or Positivist Empiric?,
27 QUALITY  & QUANTITY 47,65-66 (1993).
23.  Franqois  Wahl,  Inside or Outside Philosophy, in MICHEL  FOUCAULT:  PHILOSOPHER
65, 65-69 (Timothy Armstrong ed. & trans., 1992).CHICA GO-KENT  LAW  REVIEW
hermeneutics  is  philosophy-"held  in  place  by  the  chain  of
meaning"-though  he  goes  on  to  propose  that  Foucault  is  a
philosopher within a very definite view of the history of philosophy.2 4
Of course, in relying on Dreyfus and Rabinow's argument to the
extent  I  am,  I  am  duty-bound  to  point  out  that  they  are  equally
adamant  that Foucault  should not  be seen  as  a  structuralist  or  as  a
phenomenologist either  (two  strong possibilities  for those twentieth-
century thinkers  who  are tempted by  hermeneutics  but reject it).  In
saying  that Foucault  was  always  beyond  hermeneutics,  Dreyfus  and
Rabinow  argue  that Foucault was never a  structuralist  (even  though
he  was  tempted  by  structuralism)  because  he  never  totalized
discourse:  "Foucault  never  posited  a  universal  theory  of  discourse,
but rather sought to describe  the historical  forms  taken by discursive
practices. '"
Not  a  discourse  theorist,  not  a  structuralist,  not  a  phenom-
enologist,  and certainly  not a  practitioner  of hermeneutics.  So,  the
question  leaps  out, how can Foucault's  work  be  characterized?  It is
obviously  a tough question.  Dreyfus and  Rabinow set out to answer
it  in  a  way  many  have  sought  to  follow:  Foucault  builds  his  own
distinctive  approach.  They tell us that in doing  this, Foucault  takes
structuralism  and hermeneutics  as steppingstones  of sorts:  "Foucault
is  able  to  show how  in  our  culture  human  beings  have  become  the
sort of objects  and subjects structuralism  and  hermeneutics  discover
and  analyze.''26  In adding  to this, Dreyfus  and  Rabinow  assert  that
hermeneutics,  along  with  structuralism  and  phenomenology,  has
failed to live up to its promise as a means  of learning  from the study
of  human  beings.  "Foucault  offers,  in  our  opinion,  elements  of  a
coherent and powerful alternative means of understanding. '2 7
In  discussing  what  Foucault  actually  does  in  getting away  from
structuralism  and hermeneutics,  Dreyfus  and  Rabinow  are  adamant
that  he  "never  gives  up  his  earlier  position  that  social  institutions
influence  discursive  practices,"  though he does modify it to a certain
extent  in  The  Archaeology of Knowledge.  Via  his  archaeological
method,  they argue, Foucault "proposes  to treat  all that is said in the
human sciences as a  'discourse-object.' ' 28 This method "must remain
neutral  as  to  the  truth  and  meaning  of  the  discursive  systems  it
24.  Id.  at 76-77.
25.  DREYFUS & RABINOW, supra  note 1, at vii-viii.
26.  Id.  at viii.
27.  Id. at xiii.
28.  Id. at xx.
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studies,  [it]  is  not  another  theory  about  the  relation  of  words  and
things.
29
Dreyfus  and  Rabinow  admit  to  seeing  flaws  in  Foucault's
archaeological  method, 30  but  they  show  how  he  rescues  much  from
that method:
Foucault  abandons only the attempt to work out  a theory  of rule-
governed  systems  of discursive  practices.  As a  technique,  archae-
ology serves genealogy.  As a method of isolating discourse objects,
it serves  to distance  and  defamiliarize  the  serious discourse  of the
human  sciences.  This,  in  turn,  enables  Foucault  to  raise  the
genealogical  questions: How are these discourses used?  What role
do they play in society?3"
Dreyfus and Rabinow see Foucault's History of Sexuality Volume
One  as  a  further  instance  of  archaeology  and  genealogy  working
together  and pulling further  away from  hermeneutics.  In this book,
they  say,  "Foucault  challenges  the  hermeneutic  belief  in  deep
meaning by tracing the emergence of sexual confession and relating it
to practices of social domination."32
Dreyfus  and  Rabinow  say  that Foucault's  alternative  direction
"preserves  the  distancing  effect  of structuralism"  and  that  it uses  a
key aspect of hermeneutics-  "that the investigator  is always situated
and must understand  the meaning of his cultural practices from within
them. '33  They add, noting that Foucault was trained in both Husserl's
transcendental  phenomenology  and  the  "existential  counter-move-
ment led  by Heidegger  in  Germany  and  Maurice  Merleau-Ponty  in
France,
' 34 that  Foucault's new  direction,  like both  structuralism  and
hermeneutics,  is also a reaction to phenomenology and an attempt to
"transcend the Kantian  subject/object  division" and to "eliminate  the
Husserlian conception of a meaning-giving transcendental subject.
'3 5
So,  Foucault's  "new  direction"  owes  a  debt  to  at  least  some
aspects  of that  which  he  is  rejecting,  yet  this  direction  is  markedly
different  than  the  other  positions  that  grew  from  that which  he  is
rejecting,  especially,  as  I  am  at  pains  to  show,  Gadamerian
29.  Id.
30.  Id. at xx-xxi.
31.  Id. at  xxi.  For other attempts to show  the links  between archaeology  and  genealogy,
see  KENDALL  &  WICKHAM,  supra  note  15,  at  24-34;  Phil  Bevis  et  al.,  Archaeologizing
Genealogy: Michel Foucault  and the Economy of Austerity, in FOUCAULT'S  NEW DOMAINS,  at
xxi (Mike Gane & Terry Johnson eds., 1993).
32.  DREYFUS & RABINOW,  supra  note 1, at xxi.
33.  Id. at vii.
34.  Id. at xvii.
35.  Id. at xv.CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW
philosophical  hermeneutics.  I suggest  the  key to understanding  this
might  be  the  fact  that  Foucault's  reading  of  Heidegger  is  vastly
different  from Gadamer's  reading.  As such, we should  bear in mind
that while Foucaultian thinking and Gadamerian  thinking both have a
Heideggerian  flavor, this  does not suggest  a back-door  link  between
Foucaultians  and  Gadamerians.  Let's  explore  the  "Heideggerian
flavor"  in Foucault a little further.
The  theme  of  a  Heideggerian  influence  on  Foucault,  as
summarized  by  Dreyfus  and  Rabinow,  is  taken  much  further  by
Dreyfus  alone in a later piece.  In that essay, Dreyfus sets out to see
how  far he  can push a  comparison  between  Heidegger's  Dasein and
Foucault's power.36  He offers a quote from Foucault's final interview:
"For me  Heidegger  has  always  been  the  essential  philosopher ....
My entire philosophical  development  was determined  by my reading
of  Heidegger. '3 7  Dreyfus  also  quotes  this  interview  to  show  that
Foucault's  heavy debt to Nietzsche  is also a debt to Heidegger:  "It is
possible  that  if  I  had  not  read  Heidegger,  I  would  not  have  read
Nietzsche.  I  had tried  to read  Nietzsche  in the fifties  but Nietzsche
alone did not appeal  to me-whereas  Nietzsche  and Heidegger, that
was a philosophical shock!"3
In presenting  his  understanding  of  Being,  Heidegger,  Dreyfus
says, is interested  in our understanding  of Being, up to the point that
this understanding,
is  embodied  in the tools, language  and institutions of a society and
in  each person  growing up  in  that society.  These  shared  practices
into which  we are  socialized  provide  a  background  understanding
of what  counts  as  real,  on the  basis  of  which  we  can  direct  our
actions  towards  particular  things  and  people.  Thus  the  under-
standing  of  Being  creates  what  Heidegger  calls  a  clearing ....
Heidegger calls the unnoticed way that the clearing  both limits and
opens up what can be done, its "unobtrusive governance.39
Dreyfus  reads  much  of  Foucault's  account  of  power  "to  be
getting  at  a  similar  social  clearing  with  an  emphasis  on  the  way
embodied,  everyday practices  produce, perpetuate  and  delimit what
36.  Hubert  Dreyfus,  On  the  Ordering of Things:  Being and  Power in  Heidegger and
Foucault,  in MICHEL FOUCAULT:  PHILOSOPHER  80, 80 (Timothy Armstrong ed. & trans., 1992).
37.  Id.
38.  Id. at 80-81.
39.  Id. at  81.  This  point  coincides  with  some  of  those  contained  in  the  pointedly
Foucaultian account  of governance I have developed with Jeff Malpas.  See Jeff Malpas & Gary
Wickham, Governance and the World: From Joe DiMaggio to Michel Foucault, 3 UTS REV.  91
(1998); Jeff Malpas &  Gary Wickham, Governance and Failure: On the Limits of Sociology, 31
AUST. & N.Z. J. SOC. 37 (1995).
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people can  think and do. ' 4 0  Dreyfus  also notes here that  "power"  is
perhaps a misnomer for this phenomenon."  He adds: "For Foucault,
as  for  Heidegger  on  Being,  power  is  neither  a  fixed  entity  nor  an
institution.  "42
Continuing  this  point,  Dreyfus  quotes  Foucault  (in  an  essay
called The Subject and Power) thus:
Power,  with  or  without  a  capital  letter, which  is  assumed  to exist
universally  in  a  concentrated  or  diffused  form,  does  not  exist.
Power  exists  only  when  it  is  put  into  action ....  It  is  a  total
structure  of  actions  brought  to  bear  on  possible  actions ....
Basically  power  is less a confrontation  between  two adversaries  or
the  linking of one  to the other than  a question of government ....
To govern,  in this  sense,  is to structure the  possible field  of action
of others.
4 3
Dreyfus,  I  argue,  is  on  to  something  here-the  Heideggerian
Foucault  he  is  carefully  drawing  out  is  a Foucault  not  at  all  happy
with  standard  treatments  of the  notion  of  power,  a  thinker  seeking
more  to  account  for  the  complexities  of governing  (in  its broadest
sense)  than  to expound  yet another  account  of power-as-repression.
This  is  a  Foucault  heading  in  a  very  different  direction  than  that
chosen by Gadamer and the Gadamerians,  a direction that eventually
became,  among other things, the governmentality  approach.
Dreyfus  argues  that Foucault  speaks of power  in  the History of
Sexuality Volume One in "Heideggerian  terms" -especially  in saying
that  we  need  to  "define  the  conditions  in  which  human  beings
'problematize'  what  they are, what  they do,  and the  world  in which
they live." 44  In attempting to establish the point that Foucault is very
Heideggerian  in  thinking  about  "a  receptivity  to  being,"  Dreyfus
turns to  a quote from Foucault's  The  Use of Pleasure: "analyzing  not
behaviors  or  ideas,  nor  societies  and  their  'ideologies,'  but  the
problematizations through  which  beings offers itself as having to be
thought-and the  practices on  the  basis  of  which  these  problema-
tizations are formed."
45
40.  Dreyfus, supra note 36, at 81.
41.  This coincides with some of the objections/qualifications  I have presented  with each of
Alan Hunt and Gavin Kendall to Foucault's handling of power.  See HUNT & WICKHAM, supra
note 17, at 80-87; KENDALL & WICKHAM, supra note 15, at 47-56.
42.  Dreyfus, supra note 36, at 81.
43.  Id. at 82.
44.  Id.
45.  Id.CHICAGO-KENT  LAW REVIEW
Note  that  here  power  has  become  problematizations  of
governing,  that  is,  it  is  now  also  covering  the  thinking  necessary  to
govern.
As  well,  Dreyfus  traces  Foucault's  and  Heidegger's  common
starting  point  in  pre-Socratic  Greece.  Heidegger,  Dreyfus  argues,
showed  that  while  the  clearing  was  not  present  in  pre-Socratic
thought, neither was it denied.  Heidegger reads the "truth of being or
alathea" as  "unconcealment"  and  says  "this  understanding  was  lost
when Socrates and Plato took Being to be the ground of phenomena,
and truth to be  the correspondence  of propositions to an independent
reality."
4 6
Dreyfus  notes that Foucault's  references  to pre-Socratic  Greece
are "much sketchier"  but argues that "he too points to the emergence
of theoretical  knowing  as the great turning point in our history.  The
pragmatic  and  poetic  discourse  of  early  Greek  civilization  was
destroyed by the rise of theory. '4 7  He quotes Foucault (in L'Ordre du
Discours) to  this  effect:  "The  Sophists  were  routed...  [From]  the
time of the great Platonic division onwards, the [Platonic]  will to truth
has had its own history. '48
Dreyfus continues this point by quoting Foucault from  The Birth
of the Clinic and from History of Sexuality Volume One to show what
a  difference  this  change  made  to  the  practice  of  medicine  and  the
understanding  of  sexuality:  on  medicine-"When  Hippocrates  had
reduced  medicine  to  a  system,  observation  was  abandoned  and
philosophy  introduced  into  medicine";  on  sexuality-"the  West  has
managed  ...  to  annex  sex  to  a  field  of  rationality ....  [W]e  are
accustomed to such 'conquests'  since the Greeks. '4 9
Furthermore, Dreyfus  says, while Foucault has little to say about
Greek  philosophy  per  se,  where  Heidegger  obviously  has  much  to
say,  nonetheless,  their  "concerns  converge  upon  the  transformation
which  issues  in  the  modern  world  and  our current  understanding  of
human beings."50
Dreyfus takes the shift in the interpretation of the role of "man"
as  another  point  at  which  the  "parallel"  between  Foucault  and
Heidegger  "comes  into  sharp  focus. ' 51  He  draws  out  the  strong
46.  Id.
47.  Id.
48.  Id.  at 83.
49.  Id.
50.  Id. at 84.
51.  Id.
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similarities between  Foucault's  account  of the  rise of "man"  offered
in  The  Order of Things,  especially  as  it  is  "brilliantly"  presented
through  an  analysis  of  Velasquez's  Las Meninas, and  Heidegger's
account of the "radical  transformation  in our understanding  of being
which  took  place  in  the  seventeenth  century." 2   After  citing
Descartes as an instigator of this shift, he quotes Heidegger (in Being
and Time) to support his point about the ground shared by Heidegger
and Foucault: "What is, in its entirety, is now taken in such a way that
it only is in being to the extent that it is set up by man, who represents
and sets forth. '5 3
I have  surely said enough  to establish the point that Foucault, in
rejecting philosophical  hermeneutics,  established a viable alternative.
That this viable alternative led, at least in part, to the governmentality
approach  is assumed.  I move on now to the promised  discussion of a
small  sample  of  Gadamerian  literature,  concentrating  on  advancing
my  argument  that  Foucaultians  and  Gadamerians  have  little  in
common.
III.  A BRIEF LOOK THROUGH GADAMERIAN  EYES OFFERS No
GLIMPSE OF FOUCAULT
Mootz claims that Gadamerian  philosophical  hermeneutics  is  an
approach  based  on  "the  ontological  claim  that  all  understanding
results from  a decentering  'fusion of horizons'  in which a 'prejudiced'
individual  confronts  a  text or  other  person  in  an  'experience'  that
disrupts her presumed insularity. ' 54
We  have  already  seen  evidence  that this  is  not  a direction  that
could be called Foucaultian.  Shortly I add to this some points about
the differences between the understanding of the subject contained in
this  summary  statement  and  the  Foucaultian  understanding  of  the
subject.
Another  hint  of  this  difference  is  found  in  a  summary  point
offered by Aylesworth:
Gadamer  believes  that  the  human  sciences,  insofar  as  they
comprise  a body  of  methods  and  techniques,  are  not  indistin-
guishable  from technology and its totalizing agenda.  Philosophical
52.  Id. at 84-85.
53.  Id. at 84.
54.  Francis J.  Mootz  III, Law in Flux: Philosophical  Hermeneutics, Legal Argumentation,
and the Natural  Law Tradition, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311,314 (1999).CHICAGO-KENT LAW  REVIEW
hermeneutics,  on  the  other  hand,  offers  a  more  fundamental
understanding  of experience  in terms of practical reason.55
An  "experiencing"  subject  is,  it  seems,  central  to  Gadamerian
concerns,  while  it  is  certainly  not  central  to  Foucaultian  govern-
mentality work.56
Remembering  that Foucault  is  not  and  never  was  a  theorist  of
discourse, we should not be fooled into thinking Gadamerian remarks
about language  are  similar to the  Foucaultian  approach  to  language
even  where  they appear  so.  Some  of Smith's points about  Gadamer
on  the  statement 5 7  may  look  like some  of Foucault's  points  in  The
Archaeology of Knowledge (or even The Order of Things), but when
we  take  into  account  that  Smith  approaches  the  statement  as  a
component of language where Foucault approaches it as a component
of  discourse,  we  should  realize  that  these  are  two  very  different
ventures.  To understand this point fully, it is necessary to accept that
for Foucault  and Foucaultians  discourse  is not language  (as  it clearly
is for Gadamerians).
This point  is  made very  well  in  a  Griffith  University  discussion
document  by  Ian  Hunter  circulated  in  the  early  1980s-Michel
Foucault:  Discourse  Versus Language.8  Hunter argues that,
Foucault's reformulation  of the concept of discourse  derives from
his  attempts  to  provide  histories  of  knowledge  which  are  not
histories  of  what  men  and  women  have  thought.  Foucault's
histories are  not  histories  of ideas,  opinions  or  influences  nor are
they  histories  of  the  way  in  which  economic,  political  and  social
contexts  have  shaped  ideas  or  opinions.  Rather they  are  recon-
structions  of the  material conditions of thought  or  "knowledges."
They  represent  an  attempt  to  produce  what  Foucault  calls  an
archaeology of  the  material  conditions  of  thought/knowledges,
conditions which are not reducible to the idea of "consciousness"  or
the idea of "mind.
' " 59
55.  Gary  E.  Aylesworth, Dialogue, Text, Narrative: Confronting Gadamer  and Ricoeur, in
GADAMER AND HERMENEUTICS  68,68 (Hugh J. Silverman ed., 1991).
56.  It  has to  be admitted that when  Gadamerians  turn to certain  particular  practices  that
do not traditionally  feature  accounts of experiencing  subjects,  they are able  to leave  this plank
out of their building materials.  I have in mind, especially, Heelan's very detailed and fascinating
account of what  a hermeneutic  philosophy  of natural  science might  look like.  See  Patrick  A.
Heelan,  Hermeneutical Phenomenology and the  Philosophy of Science,  in  GADAMER  AND
HERMENEUTICS, supra  note 55-an account to which I return.
57.  P.  Christopher  Smith,  Plato As  Impulse and Obstacle in  Gadamer's Development of
Hermeneutical  Theory, in GADAMER AND  HERMENEUTICS, supra note 55, at 23, 28-33.
58.  Ian  Hunter,  Michel  Foucault:  Discourse  Versus  Language  (1984,  unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).  While this paper has never been published,  some points in  it
were  later  aired  in  IAN  HUNTER,  CULTURE  AND  GOVERNMENT:  THE  EMERGENCE  OF
LITERARY  EDUCATION 20  (1988).
59.  Hunter, supra note 58, at 45.
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In  expanding  upon this,  Hunter  goes  on  to cash  out Foucault's
metaphor that discourse  has no  inside  (that is,  no inside  in thought)
and no outside (that is, no outside  in things).  Foucault, Hunter  tells
us,  aims  to  fragment  "thinking,"  not  to  totalize  it  as  "thought"  or
"language."  In stressing that there  is no "inside,"  Foucault  is  urging
us to drop the idea of a thinking process  that can be found external to
and prior  to the  use of words  and  symbols  so  as  to  make  their  use
possible.60
Hunter  is  showing  us  Foucault's  notion  of  discourse  as  it  goes
about  producing  aspects  of  life.  A  linguistic  version  of  discourse
could not give  us  access to  these objects.  In explicating  the  "other"
side  of Foucault's treatment  of discourse-that  it has no "outside"-
Hunter says:
[O]ur  use  of  words  is  not  governed  by  the  familiar  notion  of "reference"....  [I]t is  the use  of  words  (that  is,  the  operation  of
60.  Id.  In  developing  this,  Hunter  combines  some  of  Foucault's  insights  with  some  of
Wittgenstein's  in the first of two examples:
[P]rior  to  our  use  of  words  we  do  not  have  mental  acts/processes  which  are  then
"expressed"  in words...  [for  example, consider]  a  simple  mathematical  discourse,  a
simple algebraic formula for expanding a series: y = 2x  + 5; if x  =  2, then the series runs
9,  23,  51, etc.  Now  at  any point in the expansion  of this series, what  does  it mean to
"think"  of the next number?  Surely it means to perform the calculation (the discursive
operation)  which  results  in  that  number.  There  is  no  question  of  this  discursive
operation  expressing  my  thought  of  the  next  number,  a  thought  which  exists
independently  of the operation of the mathematical  discourse.  For  this to be the case
it  would  have  to  be  possible  to  think  of  the  next  number  without  performing  the
calculation.  And  this  is  not  possible ....  It  is  unintelligible  because  performing  the
calculation  materially  produces  the  criteria for  what we  will call  "the  next number."
One  doesn't think of the next number by some  general faculty of recognition prior to
being equipped-in  a very straightforward  sense,  in schools-with  the  techniques  of
algebra.
Id.
Hunter  draws  on  Foucault's  account  of the  discourse  of  confession  in  The  History of
Sexuality Volume One to build his other example:
Here, Foucault  is making the same  general point, namely, that consciousness  of "sins
of the  flesh"  is  not  something  that exists  in  the  mind.  Rather  it  is  something  that
appears,  historically,  on  the  surface  of  an  organization  of  techniques  and
statements ....  Foucault  demonstrates  that  confession,  at  the  time  of  the  church
fathers,  wasn't  a  particularly  important  church  ritual.  Indeed,  up  until  the
Renaissance,  confession  was more  or less  an  annual  event  for  Catholics.  Foucault
records  that  during  the  Renaissance  a  pressure  emerges  for  confession  to  become
much  more  frequent,  to  become  (eventually)  a  weekly  phenomenon,  and  he  also
records that what counts as a confession changes.  The rules  for making a confession,
the structure of the confessional, the text put about for both penitent and confessors to
learn, alter.  And  they alter in  a way that privileges  what we  would now call  "sins  of
sexuality."  During  the  Renaissance  sins  of sexuality  become  the  cardinal  sins,  the
"league  ladder"  of sins  alters.  Once  gluttony  and  sloth  were  up there  with sex  but
during the  Renaissance  sex becomes  the big one and  the important  thing is  that not
only  does  sex  as  a  sin,  an  act  (as  in  adultery  and  fornication)  become  extremely
important but  also  and for the first  time, the possibility  that one might  sin in  thought
becomes important.CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
definite forms of calculation...  ) that determines what will count as
the properties  of objects.  For  example, it  would be fruitless  to try
to ground  the meaning  of y = 2x  + 4  by pointing  to the numbers
that are  its object.  The reason being that operating the formula  is
how one points to the numbers.61
Hunter  stresses  again  that  Foucault  is  not  totalizing  here,  but
fragmenting-  fragmenting  reference.  "He  is  attempting to  break  up
'reference'  into  domains of  reference, domains  established  by  the
operation  of  particular  forms  of  calculation  and  types  of statement
that  organize  the  diverse  spaces  in  which  particular  types  of object
can appear.
'62
This makes it easier to see that only those Gadamerians prepared
to  criticize  Gadamer's  "downgrading  of  the  statement '6 3  can  be
thought  of as  being even  vaguely on  the same  page  as Foucaultians.
Davey  is  such  a  Gadamerian.  He  provides  a  thoughtful  account  of
Gadamer's  complex  rejection  of  naive  ahistorical  treatments  of
statements,64 but in doing so goes so  far as  to argue, drawing  heavily
on  Pannenberg:  "Contrary  to  Gadamer's  belief  that the  statement
distorts  meaning  by  obscuring  the  background  horizon  of commit-
ments  and  assumptions  upon  which  any  discourse  depends,
Pannenberg argues  that it  is precisely the  statement  that  allows  'the
infinity of the unsaid' to come into view. '6 5
A  turn  to  the  Gadamerian  commitment  to  the  "conversation
model" yields similar results.  Mootz promotes this model thus:
Gadamer's  principal philosophical  claim is that our truthful relation
to the  world  subtends  but  is not  exhausted  by  modem  technical-
empirical science  and that the Enlightenment picture of a monadic,
prejudice-free  subject decoding the world of objects must therefore
be viewed as a mirage ....  His focus is on the seamless web of truth
and  meaning  that  we  constantly  renew  simply  in  the  course  of
living ....  From  this  perspective,  interpretation  is  not  just  an
activity designed  to  bring the being  of certain  objects  into sharper
focus; it is our fundamental mode of existing.66
This looks promising for Foucaultians,  with its focus on creating
a sharper focus  on the being  of certain  objects,  though when Mootz
selects  Gadamer's  treatment  of  the  practice  of  conversation  as
61.  Id.
62  Id.
63.  R. Nicholas Davey, A  Response to  P. Christopher  Smith,  in GADAMER  AND  HERME-
NEUTICS, supra note 55,  at 42,  53.
64.  Id. at 50-57.
65.  Id. at 55.
66.  Francis  J.  Mootz III,  Rhetorical Knowledge in  Legal Practice and Theory, 6  S.  CAL.
INTERDISC.  L.J. 491,500 (1998).
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emblematic  of  his  (Gadamer's)  philosophical  hermeneutics,  he
inadvertently  turns away from  a potential Foucaultian approach.  He
uses  the  following  quote  from  Gadamer's  Truth  and  Method  in
positioning his promotion of the conversational model:
Conversation is  a  process of coming to an understanding.  Thus it
belongs to every true  conversation that each person opens himself
to the other, truly accepts his point of view as valid  and  transposes
himself into the other to such an extent that he understands  not the
particular individual but what he says.6 7
Mootz  reads  this,  alongside  other  similar  passages,  as  "an
ontological claim about the nature of hermeneutical understanding. ' " 6 8
Gadamer's  "model"  of conversation,  Mootz  tells us, is  central  to his
method  of dealing  with texts:  "Gadamer  seriously intends  the  claim
that  interpreting  a  text  involves  entering  a  conversation  with
it ....  [T]here  is  no ahistorical  text-in-itself  that can  be applied,  but
rather only a horizontal  text that meets  an interpreter in  a dialogical
encounter within a particular context. '69
For Foucaultians,  the  conversation model  is  a diversion,  a  false
lead  in  any  investigation  seeking  to  think  in  new  ways  about  the
object  of that investigation and  its relation to other objects.  A text-
focused  formula 70  based  on the idea  of a  fixed understanding  of the
centrality  of conversation  is bound not to be where Foucaultians  are
heading.71   Where  Gadamer  and  Gadamerians  seem  to  take
conversation and dialogue as ontological  givens, Foucaultians want to
view  them solely  as  objects  to be  investigated.  Foucaultians  cannot
be tempted by Gadamer's entreaty:  "If language  has its authentic life
only  in conversation, then the Platonic dialogue  will  awaken  a living
discussion  now  as  before,  and  will  achieve  the  fertile  fusion  of  all
67.  Id. at 501.
68.  Id. at 502.
69.  Id. at 503.
70.  Aylesworth's  suggestion  that  Gadamer  is  more  text-obsessed  than  was  Dilthey-
"Gadamer  is more in agreement with Romantic hermeneutics..  .than with Dilthey, who thinks
of the  text  as the object  to be  deciphered"-is more  grist  for my  mill,  though  not, I think,  a
reason  for Foucaultians to seek to align themselves with Dilthey rather than with Gadamer  (no
models of hermeneutics  are  particularly attractive  to Foucaultians,  though some  may be  more
attractive than others).  Aylesworth, supra  note 55, at 64.
71.  Jeff  Minson  is  even  more  harsh  in  distancing  the  Foucaultian  approach  from  the
Gadamerian  approach,  especially  when  it  comes  to  investigating  politics.  See  Jeff  Minson,
Ascetics and the Demands of Participation,  9  POL. SCI.  NEWSL. 2027 (1998),  in which  he writes,
"The beginning of wisdom..,  is to bracket off that epitome of the romantic fantasy of politics as
an interminable beautiful conversation:  the normally privileged notion of 'dialogue."'CHICA GO-KENT  LA W REVIEW
horizons in which, questioning and searching, we must find our way in
our own world.
'72
But,  you  may reasonably  ask,  what  about  the  things  Gadamer
and  Foucault  share,  like  a  rejection  of the  Enlightenment  heritage
and  with it both neo-Kantianism  and  Cartesianism,  and  more  than a
passing indebtedness  to Heidegger?  As we  have already seen, in the
case of the Heidegger debt, sharing things does not in any way mean
using them in the same way.  I could well  share golf clubs with Tiger
Woods,  but,  alas,  our  uses  of  them  would  quickly  lead  people  to
forget that they  were  the  same  clubs,  so  inconsequential  would  this
fact be.
So while  Gadamer, according  to Mootz, is pointedly  challenging
"the Enlightenment model of a disinterested  observer gathering data
about  an entirely  distinct  external world, '73 he  is doing  so to further
the  conversation  model:  the  "hermeneutical  experience"  involved
here "draws upon the familiar experience  of a conversation  ....  [A]I1
understanding  occurs as the product  of the give-and-take  experiences
of the interpreter within a given historical  and social situation. '' 74  As
we have seen, there's nothing Foucaultian about this model.
In  taking  us  through  some  of  the  ways  in  which  his  work  was
influenced by Heidegger,  Gadamer says Heidegger's move away from
"academic  philosophy" -"the  history  of problems  in neo-kantianism
and  Husserl's  transcendental  phenomenology" -led  him (Gadamer)
to  see  links  between  "the  radicality  of  Heidegger's  energetic
questioning"  and "the ancient task of ethics. '7 5  From here, Gadamer
says,  "The  question  I  asked  myself was  how  one  could  speak  of an
ethics  in  Plato's  adoption  of  the  Socratic  question  and  Socratic
dialectic.  I  attempted  to  clarify  this  through  phenomenological
methods. '76   He  adds,  "I  then  found  myself  confronted  with  a
problem  that  would  later  lead  me  to  a  fundamental  problem  of
hermeneutics - the linguisticality of understanding. '77
72.  Hans-Georg  Gadamer,  Gadamer on  Gadamer, in  GADAMER  AND  HERMENEUTICS,
supra note 55,  at 13, 19.
73.  Mootz, supra  note 54, at 314-15.
74.  Id. at 315.
75.  Gadamer, supra note 72, at 15.
76.  Id. at 16.
77.  Id.  Minson's  Foucaultian  point  on  ethics  might  well  be  considered  here.  After
asserting that the hermeneutics-based  notion of dialogue presupposes that only such a mode of
exchange  can have  ethical dimensions, Minson  offers a slight qualification and adds a rhetorical
question:
I  do not  suggest  that political romanticism  is  in  play whenever  a call for  dialogue  is
heard.  But,  in  that  case,  might  there  not  be  modalities  of  discussion  in  which  the
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Gadamer  seems  to  be  suggesting  that  Heidegger  led  him  to
hermeneutics,  via a sophisticated philological study of various aspects
of  Greek  understandings  of  knowledge,  by way  of  phenomenology.
This  suggestion  is  supported  by  Gadamer  when,  in  discussing  "the
special  hermeneutical  problem  of  what  the  written  retrieval  and
repeated awakening of the figure of Socrates means in Plato's writing,
years  and  decades  after  Socrates'  death,"  he  says,  "What  was
imparted  to me by Heidegger's introduction  to Aristotle's thought in
ethics,  rhetoric, physics,  and  metaphysics  had to be  put to  a special
kind of test in the Platonic dialogue."78
This  is  all  well  and  good  and  a  sound  basis  for  a  healthy
Gadamerian  approach to various investigations  (including those of a
sociolegal  nature),  but  it must  surely raise  still  more  doubts  in  any
Foucaultian's mind that this Heidegger is the same one who inspired,
even  if  only  in  part,  the  Foucaultian  approach  I  sketched  earlier.
Foucaultians  could  never  treat  "Heidegger's  introduction  to
Aristotle's thought  in ethics, rhetoric, physics, and  metaphysics"  as  a
step on the road to the conversation  model, but would rather treat it
as  an introduction to certain objects of investigation, that is,  as an aid
to  help  us  "think  differently"  about  ethics,  rhetoric,  physics,  and
metaphysics  by way of undermining any authority they have  gathered
over the years.7 9  Heidegger  would certainly not lead  Foucaultians to
support this  authority, as he seems to lead Gadamer to do.
Smith inadvertently  highlights  differences  between,  on  the  one
hand, Nietzsche's and Heidegger's influence on Gadamer and, on the
other, the influence of these two thinkers on Foucault when he writes,
"Gadamer,  who comes to Plato with the hermeneutical concern of the
interpreter's  dialogical  encounter  with  the  'other'  of  the  text
uppermost  in  his mind,  is  able  to see  another  side  to  him  that  his
eremitic  critics,  Nietzsche  and  Heidegger,  miss. ' 8 0  Perhaps  they did
not miss  anything,  perhaps  they simply  looked  at these matters  in  a
different way, a way not encumbered by such a strong commitment  to
hermeneutics, a way that Foucault has since taken up and developed.
political-romantic criteria for dialogue are lacking, yet where discussion is not, either in
its methods or its aims, devoid of ethical value?
He  goes  on  to discuss  what such  a "procedural"  ethics might  look  like-reliability, following
meeting procedure,  etc.  Minson, supra note 71, at 27.
78.  Gadamer, supra  note 72, at 17.
79.  Id.
80.  Smith, supra note 57, at 34.CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Davey,  in  criticizing  Smith,  offers  a  glimpse  of  a  Gadamerian
reading of Heidegger  that appears  closer to the  Foucaultian reading
of his  work.  He says,  "Smith  eschews any criticism  of the conversa-
tional  model  of  hermeneutic  understanding  Gadamer  allegedly
derives from the structural character of Plato's dialogues."''  He goes
on:
What Christopher  Smith does  not make  plain,  whereas  Gadamer
most  certainly  does,  is  that  the  conversational  model  of  herme-
neutic  understanding  has  a  specific  philosophical  entailment,
namely,  a devaluation of the  status  of the propositional  statement
or assertion. 82
Is this  "devaluation  of the status  of the propositional  statement"  an
echo of the Foucault of The Archaeology of Knowledge?
Developing  his  line  of  criticism  of  Smith,  Davey  offers  some
quotes  from  Truth and Method in  support  of his  summary  of  three
themes-"language  as  the  medium  of  hermeneutical  experience,
language as determination of the hermeneutic object, and language as
the determination  of the hermeneutic  act. '83  In doing so, he suggests
he  is  drawing  out  "the  spirit  of Heidegger."8 4  He  argues  from  here
that, "A close reading  of sections  31 to 34 of Being and Time reveals
that  language  is  fundamental  to  Heidegger's  existential  herme-
neutic."85
Now Foucault  has  disappeared.  As I  argue  above,  with  much
help from  Hunter, it is  not language that is fundamental  to Foucault
(not even the  Foucault  of  The Archaeology of Knowledge and  The
Order of Things), it  is the notion  of discourse  as developed in a very
non-linguistic  manner.  Foucault  is  obviously  taking  something  else
from  Heidegger,  or  at  least  he  is  understanding  Heidegger's  basic
concepts  very differently.  As we have  already seen, one of the more
provocative  readings  of Foucault  from  within  the Foucaultian  camp
(by  Dreyfus)  actually  reads  Heidegger's  Dasein as  a  concept  that
directly parallels  Foucault's  treatment of power.  How very different
this  is  from  Davey's  understanding  of  Dasein as  derived  from  a
linguistically-related  notion of discourse:  "Dasein-the  nature  of our
being-in-the-world  as  creatures  who  understand-is  constituted  by
discourse."86
81.  Davey, supra note 63,  at 43.
82.  Id.
83.  Id. at 46.
84.  Id.
85.  Id. at 47.
86.  Id. at 48.
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Another  possible  route  for  a  link  between  Gadamer  and
Foucault  is suggested by Aylesworth.  This one  too goes  through the
town of Heidegger, but here the vehicle is Ricoeur:
Where  Gadamer  develops  a  dialogical  model  of interpretation,  in
which  the  text  is  a  "thou"  with  whom  we  are  engaged  in
conversation, Ricoeur insists upon the reflective distance of the text
as  a  linguistic  object.  This  entails  a  broader  difference  in  their
understanding  of the relation  between  philosophical  hermeneutics
and  the  practices  of  the  human  sciences.  For  Gadamer,
philosophical  hermeneutics  is more  fundamental than the methods
of  the  Geisteswissenschaften, and  provides  a  corrective  for  the
methodological  alienation of their subject matter.  Ricoeur, on the
other hand, believes  that philosophical  hermeneutics must serve  an
epistemological  function  vis-a-vis  the  human  sciences,  and  must
incorporate their critical practices into its own discourse. 7
The possible  link is, alas, another  detour, inasmuch  as Foucault,
while  closer to Ricoeur  in this way  than to Gadamer,  is much more
radical  still,  imposing  a  greater  "reflective  distance"  again,  to  the
point  where  the  human  sciences  themselves  become  his  objects  of
investigation.  Similarly,  in  regard  to  the  status  of  subjects,  when
Aylesworth  says  that  Ricoeur  understands  that  "the  identity  of the
subject  is  not  fixed,  but  enlarged  through  the  encounter  with  the
text," 88 I can treat this as further evidence in support of my point that
Ricoeur cannot quite provide a link between Gadamer  and Foucault.
This  position  too  does  not  go  far  enough-for  Foucaultians  it  is
certainly  true that the subject  does not have a fixed  identity, but it so
true  that  Foucaultians  would  not  dare  suggest  that  subjects  can  be
"enlarged"  by texts, or by anything else, as this is already to give them
too much  of an  identity,  something  which  lies  waiting  for  a text to
come  along.  For Foucaultians,  having no fixed identity means having
no identity other than that which is produced in particular situations;
there is nothing there, waiting for anything. 8 9
This  difference  between  Gadamerians  and  Foucaultians  in
handling  the  status  of  the  subject  can  be  seen  again  in  regard  to
discontinuity.  Aylesworth  says,  "Gadamer  suggests  that  one  of  our
most fundamental  experiences  of time  is that of a discontinuity, or a
87.  Aylesworth, supra note 55, at 63.
88.  Id. at 73.
89.  Lawlor, in arguing, contra Aylesworth, that there are in fact more similarities between
Ricoeur and Gadamer than there are differences, only adds fuel to my fire: if Ricoeur is in close
agreement  with  Gadamer,  he  is  no use  as  a  bridge between  Gadamerians  and Foucaultians.
Leonard  Lawlor,  The  Dialectical Unity  of  Hermeneutics:  On  Ricoeur and  Gadamer,  in
GADAMER AND  HERMENEUTICS,  supra  note 55, at 74, 82.CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
becoming other." 9  Of course Foucault's notion of discontinuity could
not  be  about  a  "fundamental  experience,"  as  there  are  no  funda-
mental  subjects  to serve as  vehicles  for such  things  as  "fundamental
experiences. "91
Risser  offers  another  possible  link  between  Gadamerians  and
Foucaultians  when  he  argues  that  some  "poststructuralist"  work,
especially  that  of  Barthes,  which  sees  itself  as  an  "advance  over
hermeneutics"  actually  misunderstands  "contemporary  herme-
neutics":
[Flor  contemporary  hermeneutics  also  insists,  in  its own  way,  on
effacing the markings which  serve as borders to a text.  In the case
of  the  border  of  signature,  of author,  this  is  most  obvious.  For
Gadamer,  the  normative  notion  of  author's  intention  represents
only  an empty  space, for what is fixed  in writing always frees  itself
for a new relationship.92
As  such,  Risser  provides  more  than  a  few  hints  that  the
poststructuralist  enterprise  and  Gadamer's  enterprise  have  a  lot  in
common.  This  would  be  ammunition  for  an  argument  that  claimed
common  ground  between  a  poststructuralist  Foucault  and  Gada-
merian philosophical hermeneutics,  but I am pointedly  not mounting
such  an  argument.  In  being  indebted,  as  I  am,  to  Dreyfus  and
Rabinow's  argument  that Foucaultian  work is  neither  hermeneutics
nor structuralism  precisely because  it follows its own direction, I feel
safe  in  adopting  the  position  that  Foucaultian  work  is  no  more
poststructuralist than it is structuralist.
Cook,  responding  to  Risser,  adds  that  poststructuralism  and
philosophical  hermeneutics  are  related  because  of  their  debt  to
Heidegger  (and Husserl).93  However, this can make no difference  for
my argument, remembering  my suggestion  that the Heidegger drawn
90.  Id.
91.  It  has  to  be  added  that  there  are  odd  occasions  on  which  Gadamerians  offer
formulations  that  are  unequivocally  close  to  Foucaultian  formulations.  For  instance,  when
Aylesworth  summarizes  Gadamer  to  the effect  that discourse  can  be  completely  without  the
"self,"  we  seem  to be on ground  that  is very  much shared  with  Foucaultians:  "For Gadamer,
philosophical  hermeneutics  is  not  an  attempt  to  recover  an  individual  'self'  from  the
proliferation  of discourses,  but  the  preservation  of  a level  of discourse  that  is ultimately  self-
less."  Id.  at  81.  Compare  this  with  Wahl's  claim  about  Foucault's  position  in  relation  to
practices of sexuality:  "The  point is that the Self is nothing more than a form called  into being
by the totality of these practices."  Wahl, supra note 23,  at 70.
92.  James  Risser, Reading the Text, in GADAMER  AND  HERMENEUTICS,  supra note 55,  at
93, 94.
93.  Deborah  Cook,  Reading  Gadamer:  A  Response  to  Risser,  in  GADAMER  AND
HERMENEUTICS, supra note 55,  at 106, 107.
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on in the Foucaultian approach and that drawn on in the Gadamerian
approach may as well be two different Heideggers.
More  tempting  for  my  argument  is  Cook's  attempt  to  bring
Derrida into the mix. 94  However, in a footnote she acknowledges that
while this move should create the space to also bring in Foucault, "It
is  the  author's  belief...  that  such  a  comparison  would  substantially
undermine any attempt to find similarities between poststructuralism,
understood as a unified set of theories, and hermeneutics." 9 5  Enough
said.
Madison,  too,  looks  into  possible  links  between  Gadamerian
hermeneutics and Derridean poststructuralism.  In his case,  however,
there is not even a hint that this may provide a route for stronger ties
between  Gadamerians  and  Foucaultians  as  he  assiduously  sets up  a
somewhat  bizarre  opposition  between  Gadamer  and  Derrida.  He
places Derrida in what he calls the  "Counter-Tradition"  (in which  he
also  places  the  Pyrrhonists,  Kierkegaard,  and  Nietzsche)96 and  then
proceeds  to  explain  how  he  cannot  really  understand  Derrida.  It
seems, however, that he can understand  him enough to claim that any
positive  features  of Derridean thinking  are  actually  already  positive
features  of  Gadamerian  thinking,  and  on  this  note  he  completely
dismisses Derrida  as  a thinker  absorbed  by  a  negative  philosophical
quest.9 7
Another possible source of a link  between the two positions  is a
shared opposition to Habermas.  Nicholson positions Gadamer  as the
winner of a long running debate between Gadamer and Habermas  in
which Habermas  argues  for  a neo-Marxist/critical  theory  rationalism
while  Gadamer  argues for  philosophical  hermeneutics.98  Should  we
94.  Id. passim.
95.  Id. at 288 n.4.
96.  Gary  B.  Madison,  Beyond  Seriousness and  Frivolity: A  Gadamerian Response to
Deconstruction,  in GADAMER  AND  HERMENEUTICS, supra note 55, at 119, 135.
97.  Froman  works  hard  to  reposition  Derrida  in  regard  to  Gadan  r,  in  response  to
Madison's  attack.  See  Wayne  J.  Froman,  L'Ecriture and Philosophical Hermeneutics, in
GADAMER  AND  HERMENEUTICS,  supra  note  55,  at  136.  Joel  Weinsheimer  is  another
Gadamerian  who  considers Derrida's work  more  sympathetically  than does Madison,  focusing
on Derrida's treatment of the  role of the dead  metaphor in philosophy.  See Joel Weinsheimer,
Gadamer's Metaphorical Hermeneutics, in GADAMER  AND  HERMENEUTICS,  supra note  55,  at
181.  However,  neither Froman  nor Weinsheimer  do  enough  to  rescue  this  potential  line  of
inquiry  in our investigation  of possible  links between  Gadamerians  and Foucaultians.  Hugh J.
Silverman  in  summarizing  Descombes,  takes  a  slightly  different  tack,  suggesting  that
Gadamerians  are  able  to  be  "at  once  hermeneutic,  analytic,  and  deconstructive."  Hugh  J.
Silverman, Interpreting  the Interpretative Text,  in  GADAMER  AND  HERMENEUTICS,  supra note
55,  at 269,  269.  This may  be so, but it does not bring the bulk  of Gadamerians,  nor Gadamer
himself, closer to a Foucaultian position.
98.  Graeme  Nicholson,  Answers to  Critical Theory, in  GADAMER  AND  HERMENEUTICS,CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
then ask, is another possible similarity an antirationalism?  We should
ask,  but I do  not think we  can get far.  I  doubt that a similar  stance
against  Habermasian  hyper-rationalism  could  do  more  than  sit
alongside  oppositions  to  neo-Kantianism  and  to  Cartesianism  as
similarities  that  ultimately  do  not  do  enough  to  overcome  the  big
differences  between  philosophical  hermeneutics  and the Foucaultian
approach.99
IV.  A FEW EXCEPTIONS?
Perhaps  a  more  likely  source  of  productive  contact  between
Gadamerians  and Foucaultians  involves  rhetoric.  Mootz  develops  a
thoughtful Gadamerian treatment of rhetoric for use in the analysis of
sociolegal objects.
In  developing  his  approach,  at  least  in  one  particular  piece,1 E
Mootz  confesses  to  some  "presumptions."  Two  of  these  are  of
interest to us:
My  thesis  is that  the  interpretive  turn in  legal  theory  works  as  a
critique  of  legal  positivism  in  at  least  one  surprising  way:  by
reinvigorating  (even if in a dramatically  new form) the  natural law
tradition.  This  thesis  [involves  some]  presuppositions ....  Hans-
Georg  Gadamer's  philosophical  hermeneutics  provides  the  most
sophisticated and  persuasive  account of the "interpretive  turn" ...
[and]  Gadamer's  hermeneutics  illuminates  the  activity  of  legal
practice  and  correlatively  that  legal  theorists  provide  important
contextual work that reinforces  Gadamer's philosophical themes. 1 01
These two "presumptions" immediately attest to the fact that, for
Mootz,  hermeneutics  needs  to  be  handled  as  a  source  of  "illumi-
nation"  of sociolegal  sites-illumination  powered,  it  seems,  by  the
contexts  produced by the sociolegal.  To put this another way, I read
Mootz as telling sociolegal scholars that Gadamer can help them only
if  they  stick  to  careful  interpretations  of contexts  they  themselves
must provide.
supra note 55, at 151.
99.  My  doubt  here  is  strengthened  by  the  fact  that  Misgeld  manages  to  find  more
similarities between  Gadamer  and  Habermas than  does  Nicholson,  even  though he eventually
acknowledges  mainly  differences  between  them.  See  Dieter  Misgeld,  Modernity  and
Hermeneutics:  A  Critical-Theoretical  Rejoinder,  in GADAMER AND  HERMENEUTICS,  supra note
55, at 163.
100.  Mootz, supra note 54, at 311.
101.  Id. at 312-13.
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Mootz  takes  us  further  into  the  nexus  between  his  version  of
Gadamerian  philosophical  hermeneutics  and  sociolegal  studies  when
he notes,
Today, the legal system-which  is premised  on the production  and
interpretation  of  authoritative  texts  as  sources  of  governing
authority-is a prominent venue for this hermeneutical  experience,
since  the  performance  and  reception  of  speeches  before  all
competent  citizens of the  polis no longer  occurs.  Every attempt to
understand  a  legal  text, Gadamer  insists, is  a  function  of applying
the  text  to  the  case  at  hand; thus  he  regards  legal  reasoning  as  a
particularly vivid model of all hermeneutical understanding. 1°2
Expanding  on  the  idea  of  understanding  a  legal  exchange  as  a
conversation,  Mootz  adds,  "An interpreter  understands what  a  legal
text is  saying  by  suppressing her subjective  designs and  allowing  the
text to speak to the question posed by the case at hand.'
10 3
I have  already argued that the text-focus of Gadamerians is a bar
to productive  contact  between  them  and  most Foucaultians.  But  as
Mootz is taking us on a very particular sociolegal journey, I bear with
him.
Summarizing  Gadamer's  treatment  of  "the  rhetoric  of  legal
argumentation,"  Mootz  says,  "Gadamer's  hermeneutics  is  philo-
sophical  because  it abandons  the  focus on  methodological  rules  and
instead analyses the unitary hermeneutical  situation that subtends  all
human knowledge,  including the  methodologically-secured  empirical
knowledge  of  positive  science."'0 4   Mootz  stresses  that  the
Gadamerian  approach  necessarily  "signals  the  tremendous  impor-
tance  of the  rhetorical  tradition."'15  He develops  this  point by  first
discussing the importance  of Vico  to Gadamer's  Truth and Method'°6
and  then  by  discussing  what  Gadamer  is  trying  to  do  in  regard  to
rhetoric  more  generally:  "As  one  commentator  recently  concluded,
Gadamer  is  not  advocating  that  we  elevate  rhetorical  study  over
philosophy  as  much  as  insisting  on  the  rhetorical  nature  of  all
humanistic  inquiry,  including  philosophy.' 17  Mootz  is  particularly
concerned  that  we  understand  Gadamer's  debt  to  ancient  rhetoric:
"Gadamer  relates  ancient  rhetoric  to  his  inquiry  into  our  pre-
methodological,  traditional  complex  of  meanings ....  Gadamer
102.  Id. at 317.
103.  Id. at 318.
104.  Id. at 314.
105.  Id. at 315.
106.  Id. at 315-16.
107.  ld. at 316.CHICAGO-KENT  LAW  REVIEW
argues that genuine rhetoric concerns the 'discovery  and transmission
of insight and knowledge,'  an event that he reminds us is exemplified
in the 'art of leading a conversation. 1 0 8
Is  this  ground  that  is  actually  shared  by  the  Gadamerian
approach  and the Foucaultian approach?  To put a positive spin on it,
we  can  at  least  say  that  inasmuch  as  rhetoric  can  be  broadly
understood  as  a  tradition  that  favors  persuasion  over  dogma,
construction  over  bedrock,  interpretation  over  the  imposition  of
supposed  fact, there  may well  be a commonality here.  But we  must
look further.
In discussing the way Gadamerian hermeneutics  concentrates on
meanings  produced  by  and  through  individual  experiencing  subjects
as they relate to one another and to texts, Mootz further emphasizes
the  role  of  rhetoric:  the  interpreter  acts  in  the  manner  described
above "rather than by charting in advance the line of inquiry, just as a
rhetorician must be attuned to her audience."'1 9  The interpreter must
"suppress  her  subjective  aims  [and]  attend  [to]  the  saying"  of the
historically  effective  text  as  it  is  revealed  in  particular  circum-
stances.110  For  example,  Gadamer  believes  law  holds  authority
because  it is the practice  of hermeneutically  appropriating  governing
texts to current disputes.
The  Foucaultian  package  under  consideration  would  certainly
place  the  emphasis  of  the  analyses  differently,  but,  sticking  to  my
positive spin for the  time being, it  is reasonable to say that rhetoric's
pragmatic  underpinnings  can  be  counted  as  a  vague  family
resemblance between  Gadamerian and Foucaultian approaches.
Mootz insightfully marries Gadamer to the pragmatic philosophy
of Chaim Perelman.  He  says  that Gadamer  and Perelman are  each
"important  contributors  to  this  century's  philosophical  effort  to
identify  the  deficiencies  of  the  Cartesian  tradition  and to  fashion  a
new  account  of understanding  and  knowledge."''  After  acknowl-
edging  substantial  differences  in  their  backgrounds  and  trainings,
Mootz  posits:  "[I]t  is  plain  that  Gadamer  and  Perelman  share
important  themes:  the  dialogic  character  of  understanding,  the
inadequacy  of neo-Kantianism  as  an  account  of knowledge,  and  the
overriding  ethical  imperative  of holding oneself open to  questioning
108. Id. at 316-17.
109.  Id. at 318.
110.  Id.
111.  Mootz, supra note 66, at 498.
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and  challenges  rather  than  proceeding  as  if  one  is  possessed  of
apodictic  truth. '112  Mootz  also  says  that Gadamer  is  developing  the
"rhetorical  tradition"'  to "serve  as  a resource for textual interpreters
in our literate culture.' 1 13
In synthesizing  Gadamer  and Perelman,  Mootz sees the need  to
highlight  a  couple  of weaknesses  of  Gadamer's  approach:  Gadamer
"does  not develop  a pragmatic  account of rhetorical  exchange";  and,
"Gadamer's  phenomenology  of  understanding  remains  somewhat
vague with respect to the activities by which people pursue justice and
morality in the course of daily life. '114  Perelman provides the perfect
means of correction:
Perelman demonstrated  in his first book that arguments  about the
dictates  of justice  could not  be  rational  since  they did not accord
with  formal  logic.  Confronted  by  this  bizarre  yet  inescapable
conclusion, Perelman rejected the Cartesian  philosophical  tradition
from which  it issued  and  set for himself the task of identifying the
means  by  which  it  is  possible  to  secure  adherence  to  reasonable
claims regarding the requirements of justice.'
Mootz  traces  Perelman's  Aristotlean  move  to  "distinguish
rational truths from reasonable  arguments.'116  In  doing this, he says,
"As  a prime  example,  Perelman points to the  operation of the  legal
system in which  arguments  are made  and action is taken despite the
inevitable  lack  of indubitable  knowledge  about  the  questions  raised
by the case at hand."" ' 7  Mootz thereby uses Perelman to advance the
case for a style of sociolegal inquiry that can act as a sort of model for
philosophical  inquiry more generally,  suggesting that this  is closer to
an ancient understanding  of philosophy than it is to modern thinking
on the matter. 118
As  I  argued  earlier,  Foucaultian  work  can  also  sensibly  be
understood  as  a  development  of  a  certain  type  of  ancient  thinking
which  equally  rejects  the  dominance  of Cartesian  and neo-Kantian
propositions  in favor  of  a type  of pragmatism.  As Wahl puts it, "if
one  can  speak  of  a  continuity  from  the  first  to  the  last  in  Michel
Foucault's  work..,  it  is  found...  in  his  pragmatism ....  In  other
words, it is  not so much  a question of what was (or is), but rather  of
112.  Id. at 507.
113.  Id.
114.  Mootz, supra note 54, at 320.
115.  Id. at 320.
116.  Id.
117.  Id. at 321.
118.  Id. at 321-23.CHICAGO-KENT  LAW REVIEW
what was done, as it was being done."119  Obviously  I am not going to
go  so far as to say that the Gadamerian  and Foucaultian  approaches
are equally in the thrall of Perelman, simply that some of the themes
Perelman  draws out  are  examples  of what  is best about each  of the
two packages.
Mootz  is obviously  involved in a bid to secure a framework  that
can  be  used  to  consistently  capture  the  practice  and  the  spirit  of
knowledge  as rhetoric.  In this sense,  "[r]hetorical  knowledge can  be
defined  as  the  effort  of  two  or  more  persons  working  together
creatively  to refashion  the  linguistically  structured  symbols of social
cohesion  that  serve  as  the  resources  for  intersubjective  experience
with  the  aim  of  motivating  action  of  some  kind."1  20   Further,
"[r]hetorical  activity..,  is  not  a  technical  skill  employed  in  the
pursuit  of  independently  selected  ends  but  rather  is  a  means  of
discerning  and  evaluating  the  ends  available  to  a  given  community
with certain means at its disposal." 21
Mootz, drawing on Perelman, has the legal system at the front of
his  thinking:  "The  legal system is one  of the most  important fora for
the development  of rhetorical  knowledge  in contemporary  American
society."1 22  He  supports  this  claim  by  making particular  use  of  the
1997  Washington  v.  Glucksberg  case  about  "assisted  suicide." 123
Discussing Justice Souter, Mootz says, "Souter's opinion persuasively
describes  the  adjudication of fundamental  rights as  a hermeneutical-
rhetorical  project  in  terms  that  Gadamer  and  Perelman  would
endorse,  even though Souter articulates his reasoning  in the idiom of
contemporary constitutional discourse.124
119.  Wahl,  supra note 23,  at  70.  DREYFUS  & RABINOW,  supra note  1, at  xxii (suggesting
that Foucault always  worked  with a commitment to a  certain form  of pragmatism).  Foucault,
they say, "annoys  many by insisting  on a pragmatic intent  in all significant  historiography"  and
add that his interpretation of history "grows out of pragmatic concerns."  Id.
120.  Mootz, supra note 54, at 323.
121.  Id. at 325.
122.  Id.
123.  Id. at 326-27  nn.43 & 47.
124.  Id. at 326.  Mootz adds:
Souter  tracks  the  philosophical  claims  made  by  Gadamer  and  Perelman  about  the
nature of human understanding  and the acquisition of  knowledge, lending  support  to
the claim  that the demands of legal  practice  may indeed  highlight the hermeneutical-
rhetorical features of all understanding.  Lawyers  know very well that argumentation is
a bounded  and  rational  enterprise  that  nevertheless  cannot  aspire  to  a  process  of
deduction from principles,  even though  the rhetorical conventions of legal practice  and
judicial  opinion-writing  ironically  work  to  conceal  this  (supposedly  dangerous)
fact ....
Id. at 327.
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A Foucaultian approach to any particular judicial decision might
well accept  Mootz's claims about judges and lawyers and their use of
argumentation  fitting  certain  rhetorical  philosophical  principles.
However,  it  would  also  add  a  historical  dimension.  No  judicial
decision could  be understood  by  a Foucaultian  without tying  it to  a
genealogy  of  the  way  decisions  are  made  and  presented  within
particular  jurisdictions:  a  history  of  some  of  the  contingencies-
courts,  written  judgements,  reporting  procedures,  architecture,  and
other court cultural factors, etc. -of  the decisions.
Mootz  bids  to  secure  a  framework  that  can  be  used  to
consistently capture  the practice  and the spirit of legal knowledge  as
rhetoric.  In this sense,
Rhetorical  knowledge  can  be defined as  the effort of two or more
persons  working  together  creatively  to refashion  the linguistically
structured symbols of social cohesion that serve as the resources for
intersubjective  experience  with  the  aim  of  motivating  action  of
some kind.
12 5
Further,  "Rhetorical  activity..,  is  not  a  technical  skill  employed  in
the  pursuit  of independently  selected  ends  but rather  is  a  means of
discerning  and evaluating  the ends  available  to  a  given  community
with certain means at its disposal. '12 6
In  using  Perelman  in  this  way,  Mootz  provides  another  touch
that might sit well on a Foucaultian canvas.  Rather than relying on an
inflexible notion of the individual and individual experience,  here the
stress  is  on  the  development  and  management  of  a  particular
intersubjective  realm,  a  community,  understood  not  as  an  organic
Gemeinschaft  but  more  as  a  construction,  an  invention,  as
Foucaultians are wont to call it.
So, can I then say that rhetoric, especially as explored by Mootz's
reading of Perelman as a boost to Gadamerians, provides a means of
building  an exception to my rule that Gadamerians and Foucaultians
should be very wary of each other?  I can only do so weakly.  Or more
accurately, I can only do so warily.  The above discussion does not, I
suggest,  provide  a  warrant  for  anything  more.  And,  of  course,  a
suggestion  that  Gadamerians  and  Foucaultians  must  be  wary  in
dropping  their  wariness  of  the  other  is  hardly  an  argument  against
them being wary.
125.  Id. at 323.
126.  Id. at 325.CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
The final candidate  I consider  for the  status of exception  to my
rule  is Heelan's  Gadamerian  account  of science  that I touched upon
earlier.  In  building  his  account,  Heelan  offers  the  following  point
about "theory" which involves a point about "explanation":
[W]hatever  is  observed  (inside  or  outside  of  science)  involves
things  which  are  not  directly  observed  but  are  implied  by  the
semantic network  of the  language.  Such semantic connections  are
not  of  themselves  scientific  (i.e.,  explanatory-theoretical)  con-
nections, and do not constitute a theory, for they are to be found in
natural  language  which  is  not  a  theory  about  the  world  but  a
description  of  it.  A  theory  is  rather  about  what  underlies-
"explains"-the objects of a descriptive semantic network. 27
Perhaps  this passage, while skeptical in a Foucaultian manner,  is too
language-focused  to  appeal  to  Foucaultians.  But,  in  adding  the
following definition of the history of science, Heelan comes closest to
providing a solid link between Gadamerians and Foucaultians:
The history of science is  more than the  history  of scientific writing
and  discourse,  including  illustrations,  mathematical  models,  or
abstract  theories;  in addition,  there  is the  history of the culture of
laboratory  instruments  with  special  reference  to  readable  tech-
nologies. 28
This quite Foucaultian account  bears  a strong similarity  to some
of  the  work  of  Bruno  Latour,  one  of  the  founders  of  a  recently
developed school of "science studies" who has been taken up by some
Foucaultians  as  one  of the  heirs  to  Foucault's approach. 1 2 9  Despite
this,  and  while  conceding  that  Heelan's  Gadamerian  account  of
science  provides  the  possibility  of  a  genuine  link  between
Gadamerians  and Foucaultians,  I head  to my  conclusion  saying  that
one strong link does not a bridge make.
CONCLUSION
I  have  said  enough  to  spell  out  my  argument-it  is  difficult,
perhaps  impossible, to successfully  mix Foucaultian and Gadamerian
insights into  a framework  for sociolegal  studies.  But perhaps I have
not said enough  to make  clear my disappointment  at this outcome.  I
127.  Heelan, supra note 56, at 226.
128.  Id. at 227.  Kockelmans offers  a sympathetic critique of Heelan.  In doing so, he argues
that  "all human  truth claims are claims  within limited  contexts of meaning," and invites greater
consideration by scholars of science of the conditions  of truth, a position which might be said to
be  closer  to some  Foucaultians  than  to  most  Gadamerians.  Joseph  J.  Kockelmans,  Beyond
Realism and Idealism: A  Response to Patrick A.  Heelan, in GADAMER  AND  HERMENEUTICS,
supra note 55,  at 213, 239.
129.  KENDALL & WICKHAM, supra note 15, at 60-61.
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began this project with the genuine  hope  that some sort of workable
alliance  would  be  forged.  I  must  conclude,  albeit  reluctantly,  by
facing  the  fact  that  any  attempt  to  read  Foucault  and  Gadamer
together,  through  a single  lens, inevitably  confronts the  dilemma  of
how to bring them both into focus simultaneously.  There is no single
reading, it seems, that is adequate to both, since they are each dealing
with  a  slightly  different,  although  sometimes  overlapping,  set  of
problems,  to  which  they  bring  different,  though  sometimes
overlapping, approaches.  At best, one has to adjust one's vision so as
to  view  each  separately.  While  this  means  that  they  cannot  be
brought into  any simple  conjunction,  it also  means that they cannot
be simply  opposed  either.  As  I  suggested  at  the  outset,  a nodding
acquaintanceship  might be as good as it gets. 30
130.  I owe the formulation of much of this conclusion to Jeff Malpas.